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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
David Eby's appeal is from a final order1 entered by the Third Judicial District
Court of Summit County, State of Utah. That court is a "court of record." UTAH CODE
ANN. § 78-1-2.1(3) (1988). Therefore, the Utah Supreme Court has original appellate
jurisdiction over the final order of that court. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2-2(3)(j) (2001);
Utah R. Civ. P. 3 and 4. The Utah Supreme Court transferred this appeal to the Utah
Court of Appeals which also has appellate jurisdiction over cases transferred from the
Supreme Court. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2-2(4) (2001) and § 78-2a-3(2)0) (2001).
Therefore, jurisdiction is proper in this Court. In fact, this Court already has expressly
ruled that it has jurisdiction over this appeal. See Order Partially Dismissing Appeal And
Denying Stay, entered in this matter on April 5,2005, page 2.
STATEMENT OF ISSUE AND STANDARD OF
APPELLATE REVIEW
A.

Issue

Did the trial court err in not granting Defendant David Eby relief, pursuant to
Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b), from the judgment entered against him which did not give him the
benefit of a credit for Plaintiffs settlement with Co-defendant Geary Construction, Inc.
Plaintiffs settlement with Co-defendant Geary Construction, Inc. was for an amount far
in excess of the amount of that Co-defendant' s share of liability and even was in excess

!

This Court has ruled that an order denying relief under Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)
constitutes a final appealable order. See Order Partially Dismissing Appeal And Denying
Stay, entered in this matter on April 5, 2005, page 2 (citing Arnica Mut Ins. Co. v.
Schettler, 768 P.2d 950, 970 (Utah Ct. App, 1989)).
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of the Plaintiffs total damages as determined by the jury. UTAH CODE ANN. § 15-4-3
(1953) provides that the amount or value received by a tort obligee from one tort obligor
"shall be credited" against the obligation of all co-obligors. Unless Section 15-4-3 is
invalid, the trial court erred in not granting Defendant David Eby relief from a judgment
that did not give him the credit mandated by that statute. In determining the validity of
Section 15-4-3, this Court will have to decide if that statute was implicitly repealed by
the enactment of UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-27-37 etseq. (1986, as amended).2
B.

Standard of Review

Usually, a ruling on a motion for relief from judgment will not be disturbed absent
an abuse of discretion. Birch v. Birch, 771 P.2d 1114, 1117 (Utah Ct App. 1989).
However, that is because of the factual nature of many of the reasons for such relief.
Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b) (such fact intensive reasons include inadvertence, surprise,
excusable neglect, newly discovered evidence that could not be discovered earlier,
misrepresentation, misconduct, etc.). E.g., Birch, 111 P.2d at 1117-18 (no abuse of
discretion where divorce decree was based on the fact of the parties' stipulation).
However, when the ruling results from a misinterpretation of law, the proper standard of
review should be correction-of-error. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935-36 (Utah 1994)
("the effect of a given set of facts is a question of law and, therefore, one on which an
appellate court owes no deference to a trial court's determination"). In the case at bar, the
trial court's ruling is predicated upon its interpretation of the law. The specific fact of

2

These pertinent statutes are included in the Addendum.
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Plaintiffs receipt in settlement from one tort obligor of more than the total damages the
jury determined she sustained is not disputed. The trial court denied relief from the
judgment which had provided no credit for the settlement only because the trial court
decided that the statute requiring such a credit (UTAH CODE ANN. § 15-4-3) had been
implicitly repealed by the enactment of UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-27-37 et seq. (1986, as
amended). The correction-of-error standard applies to this case because the interpretation
and application of a statute is a question of law. Taylor v. Johnson, 1999 UT 35, ^[6, 977
P.2d 479,480; A.K. & R. Whipple Plumbing and Heating v. Aspen Construction, 1999 UT
App 87, flO, 977 P.2d 518, 521. See also Jorgensen v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 769
P.2d 809, 811 (Utah 1988) (the proper allocation of payments made to a judgment
creditor is a question of law).
C.

Preservation of Issue Below

This issue of a credit for the Geary Construction settlement was raised below at
several times in different ways. It was raised first in Eby's Motion For Admission Of
Evidence Regarding Remediation And, If Necessary, For Short Continuance Of Trial For
Remediation To Be Completed. R. 777-789. As explained below, the trial court did not
rule on this legal issue before trial. Consequently, the trial court was reminded of this
issue after trial in Defendant David Eby's Objections To Plaintiffs Proposed Judgment.
R. 1170-77. The issue was further briefed in Eby's Motion To Be Credited With Geary
Construction, Inc.'s $140,000 Settlement With Plaintiff. R. 1181-92, 1238-42. When the
judgment was entered before a ruling on this legal issue, it was raised again in Eby's
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Motion For Relief From Judgment. R. 1193-1209, 1229-34.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTE
The validity of the following statute is determinative of the issue before this Court
on appeal:
The amount or value of any consideration received by the
obligee from one or more of several obligors, or from one or
more of joint or of joint and several obligors, in whole or in
partial satisfaction of their obligations shall be credited to
the extent of the amount received on the obligation of all
co-obligors to whom the obligor or obligors giving the
consideration did not stand in the relation of a surety.
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 15-4-3 (1953) (emphasis added).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.

Nature of Case, Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below

Plaintiff/Appellee, Venna M. Swalsberg Lange ("Lange"), is the trustee for the
Carl A. Swalsberg Family Trust which owns real property near the National Forest in
Summit County. R. 2; Plaintiffs Exhibits P-21 and P-27. For at least fifty years that
property has had a narrow dirt road extending through it for foot and vehicular traffic. R.
3. Defendant/Appellant, David Eby ("Eby"), also owns real property in Summit County
further up the canyon from Lange's property, and the dirt road through Lange's property
is, and has been used by Eby and the general public to get to and from their property and
for access to National Forest lands. R. 3, 1326 (Tr. 18-41, 179-85); Defendant's Exhibits
102 and 103.
Lange brought trespass and negligence claims for damage to her real property. R.
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1-8; 1130-41. This resulted from Eby contracting with Co-defendant Geary Construction,
Inc. ("Geary") to have Geary widen the subject road in certain especially narrow
locations, including some locations where that road went through Lange's property. In
those places, the road was widened from 10 feet to approximately 16 feet so that two
vehicles safely could pass each other without one or the other backing up. R. 3, 1326;
Plaintiffs Exhibits P-3 and P-4. Eby had the work done by Geary, believing he had
Summit County's written permission to do so. R. 33-35,45, 1326; Defendant's Exhibits
100 and 101. Summit County was not brought into the suit by Lange, but Geary was a
party and agreed just before trial to settle with Lange for what was determined to be a
total value of $140,000. R. 1083-84.3 Although Eby was the only defendant at trial, the
question of the apportionate share of fault of both Summit County and Geary also was
submitted to the jury. R. 1144-45.
Upon learning of the settlement, Eby filed a pretrial motion to be able to inform
the jury of the remedial work Geary agreed to do on Lange's property as part of the
settlement, so that the jury would not award damages for remedial work that, pursuant to
Geary's agreement, no longer needed to be done. R. 777-89, 1046-49. The trial court
denied Eby's request and stated in its pretrial ruling: "If a verdict is rendered against Eby,
the court will invite further argument and briefing on whether whatever award plaintiff
receives from the jury as a verdict against Eby ought to be reduced by whatever is
3

The amount of the value of this settlement, $140,000, was obtained from DeAnn
Geary during trial, out of the presence of the jury. It consisted of the payment of money
and remedial landscaping work. R. 1081; Defendant's Exhibit 104. This amount has not
been disputed by Lange.
-5-

received from Geary in settlement

The court believes that if a verdict is rendered

against Eby the amount of that award can later be compared by the court with the
settlement, including the value of remediation by Geary, to determine if indeed plaintiff is
being compensated twice." The trial court expressly ruled that it was not at that time
ruling on the legal issue of whether Lange could recover more than Lange's total damages
as a result of the settlement. R. 1048-49.
During trial, the trial court ruled as a matter of law that the subject road was a
public road. R. 1136. In making that ruling, the trial court further ruled that the width of
that public road was "approximately ten (10) feet" in accordance with its historical use.
Id. The trial court rejected Eby's position that roads that become public through public
use are deemed to be as wide as "reasonable and necessary to ensure safe travel," per
Utah Code § 72-5-104. R. 884-86. Indeed, Eby argued that in Summit County, the
"minimum right-of-way width for a public road shall be sixty (60) feet." Eastern Summit
County Development Code, Chapter 6, § 6.60(B)(3). R. 605, 885. Nevertheless, the trial
court allowed Lange to recover damages for any destruction of trees and shrubbery on her
property that was outside that narrow road width often feet. R. 1136.
In this generous measure of damage context, the jury returned a special verdict that
found Lange to have suffered only $15,000 for damages to her trees and $20,000 for other
damages due to trespass, and an additional $20,000 due to negligence. R. 1168. Eby was
found to have been 85% at fault, with Geary 5% and Summit County 10%. R. 1169.4

4

Lange also was awarded $1,000 in punitive damages.
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That verdict was entered July 8, 2004. R. 1157.
As contemplated by the trial court's pretrial ruling described above, Eby
immediately began to prepare his motion on the issue of the credit to which he believed
he was entitled because of the $140,000 settlement Lange received from Geary.
On July 12, 2004, four days after the verdict, Lange filed and served her proposed
form of judgment. R. 1165. The trial court entered it the next day on July 13,2004.
R. 1163-64. Not knowing the judgment had been entered by the trial court, Eby filed on
July 15,2004 his Objections To Plaintiffs Proposed Judgment. R. 1170-75. Therein Eby
took the unequivocal position that "no judgment should be entered until the issues raised
by these objections, and the issue of the credit to which Eby is entitled from Geary's
settlement with Lange, is ruled upon by the Court." R. 1170.
Believing his objections to the proposed judgment had yet to be considered, and
not knowing that the judgment had been entered, Eby then filed in support of his
objections Eby's Motion To Be Credited With Geary Construction, Inc.'s $140,000
Settlement With Plaintiff, and supporting memorandum. R. 1181-92. The issue of the
credit to be given Eby is the issue the trial court previously ruled that it would consider
should a verdict be entered against Eby. R. 1048-49. This motion was mailed to the trial
court for filing on July 16, 2004. R. 1182, 1191.
When Eby's counsel discovered on July 20,2004 that Lange's proposed judgment
in fact had been entered by the trial court before it even received Eby's objections and
before it had more fully considered the issue of the credit, Eby immediately filed Eby's
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Motion For Relief From Judgment R. 1193-1209. That motion is dated and was mailed
to the trial court for filing, and served on Lange, on July 20, 2004, only one week after the
entry of the judgment which Eby sought through this latest motion to have vacated. Id.
This motion was brought in accordance with Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b). This rule, Eby
argued, should be applied to grant Eby relief from the judgment because the trial court
had not applied the law pertaining to Eby's right to be credited with the $140,000
settlement Lange received from Geary, and had not even allowed Eby to be heard on this
issue. R. 1198-99.
On December 12, 2004, the trial court heard oral argument and ruled from the
bench, denying Eby's Motion to be Credited with the Geary Settlement and the
subsequent Motion for Relief from Judgment relating to the same issue. The trial court
concluded that Eby was not entitled by law to be credited with any portion of Geary's
$140,000 settlement payment to Lange, adopting Lange's argument that the statutory
provision that requires this credit was implicitly repealed by the Liability Reform Act. R.
1278-82. Lange's counsel was to submit proposed written orders. R. 1281. Because
Utah R. Civ. P. 7(f)(2) requires proposed written orders to be submitted within 15 days
after the Court's decision, Lange's counsel had until December 21, 2004 to submit
proposed written orders to Eby. That was not done.
When the mandatory deadline for the submission of proposed written orders
passed, Eby filed his Notice Of Appeal on December 27, 2004. R. 1287-89. Written
orders finally were submitted to Eby and were entered by the trial court on January 6,
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2005. R. 1314-19. Eby now submits this brief on appeal in support of why the trial court
should be reversed in its ruling as expressed in its Order Denying Eby's Motion For
Relief From Judgment. That order should be reversed, and as a consequence the
judgment should be vacated, for the reasons discussed herein.
This appeal does not include, because of this Court's April 5, 2005 Order Partially
Denying Appeal And Denying Stay, a request that the trial court be reversed for its denial
of Eby's motion to alter or amend the judgment. This appeal now only includes the
request that the trial court be reversed in its denial of Eby's motion for relief from the
judgment. The first motion was in the nature of a Utah R. Civ. P. 52(b) or 59(e) motion,
and the latter a Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion. Although the substance of both motions
pertain to the credit to which Eby is entitled by law, this Court can fully rule on this issue
and grant Eby relief from the judgment because of the trial court's denial of Eby's Rule
60(b) motion, the order that still is at issue in this appeal. The law requires Eby to be
credited with Geary's settlement payment to Lange, and the judgment did not do this.
The judgment can be ruled by this Court to be a judicial mistake, and that it has been
satisfied, discharged or is void as a matter of law. This Court can also grant relief from
this judgment for the reason that it is not equitable that it should have prospective
application and for the miscellaneous reasons of subsection (6) of Rule 60(b).
Eby herein discusses the difference in his two motions and the trial court's two
orders because of this Court's April 5, 2005 ruling wherein it denied having jurisdiction
over the earlier, Utah R. Civ. P. 52(b) or 59(e), motion and order because Eby's Notice Of
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Appeal was filed after the oral ruling but before the entry of the written order. This
Court's ruling is based upon a technical reading of Utah R. App. P. 4(b) and (c) that does
not extend the common sense provision of Rule 4(c) to motions filed pursuant to Rule
4(b). Eby proceeds to prosecute this appeal on the basis of what this Court expressly has
allowed, i.e., a review of "the grounds for denial of the rule 60(b) motion." See Order
Partially Dismissing Appeal And Denying Stay, page 2.
B.

Statement of Facts

Geary was a named defendant who was alleged to be a co-obligor with Eby for the
same real property damage Lange claimed to suffer. All of Lange's tort claims for relief
were alleged against both Eby and Geary. R. 1-8. In her prayer, Lange sought the same
type and amount of damages from both Eby and Geary. R. 7. There never has been any
claim or evidence that a surety relationship existed between Geary and Eby. Geary, on its
own, settled before trial for a total value to Lange of $140,000. R. 1083-84.5 The jury
was informed that Geary settled but was not informed of the amount of remuneration
received by Lange from Geary, including what was received through remedial work. R.
1145. Therefore, the jury determined the fiill extent of Lange's alleged damages, without
knowing about and without making any reduction for any payment from or remedial work
by Geary. The jury found that both Eby and Geary were at fault for Lange's real property
damage and that the total amount she was entitled to receive to make her whole amounted
to no more than $57,000. R. 1155-56. On that verdict, a judgment was entered for Lange

5

See supra note 3.
-10-

and against Eby for $47,750 more than what Lange already had received from Geary. R.
1163-64. If Lange is allowed to recover from Eby on this judgment, she will receive a
total of $187,750, to compensate her for a judicially determined loss of $57,000. She will
receive a windfall of over 300%.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court erred in denying Eby a credit for the Geary settlement that was
above Geary's share of fault and even above Lange5 s total damages. There are good
policy reasons for allowing the credit. Significantly, the failure to allow a credit promotes
litigation without risk, or in other words a form of gambling that results in recoveries that
exceed the amount of damages incurred. The law should remain what it always has been;
it should limit plaintiffs to one recovery for their damages. The fact that some tort law
has changed through tort reform has no applicability to the separate and independent "one
recovery rule."
The one recovery rule is codified and that legislation has not been repealed by
subsequent tort reform. Neither should the one recovery rule be deemed implicitly
repealed. The rules of statutory construction require there to be irreconcilable conflicts
between a recent statute and a former statute before there can be an implicit repeal.
Statutes must be construed to be in harmony with each other. The more recent tort reform
legislation is not in conflict, to any extent, with the codified one recovery rule. This Court
should reject Lange's invitation, accepted by the trial court, to judicially legislate new law
in Utah.
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Since the trial court erroneously rejected statutory law, this Court should correct
that legal error. That legal error is a judicial mistake. It resulted in the erroneous
conclusion that Eby was not entitled to a credit and, therefore, that the judgment was not
satisfied. It resulted in the erroneous legal conclusion that the judgment should be
enforced thereby giving it prospective application until paid by Eby. It resulted in the
grave injustice that Eby continues to be subject to a judgment that the legislature intended
the law to disallow.
The trial court never should have entered the judgment in the first place. Doing so
was legal error because it was entered before even allowing Eby time to object. It was
entered despite an earlier ruling that the legal issue of the credit was to be resolved before
any judgment on a verdict against Eby would be entered. It was entered before allowing
the legal issue of the effect of the credit to be fully addressed. Despite these judicial
mistakes and equitable reasons for relief, the trial court refused to grant Eby relief from
the judgment.
This Court should reverse the erroneous ruling of the trial court and grant Eby
complete relief from the judgment as a matter of law.
Should the judgment be affirmed, plaintiff will receive a windfall of over 300
percent of what the jury found to be her damages. She also will have the benefit of a
wider, and safer, road. This Court should assure that justice and equity is applied in this
case.
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ARGUMENT
The trial court erred in denying Eby's Rule 60(b) motion. The trial court
erroneously concluded that Eby was not legally entitled to be credited with any portion of
Geary's $140,000 settlement with Lange which Geary provided to compensate Lange for
her real property damage. The underlying legal conclusion for the trial court's ruling
should be corrected, and this Court now should assure that Eby is given the benefit of the
credit required by law.
Utah law unequivocally requires Eby to be credited with Geary's settlement.
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 15-4-3 (1953). In this case, the settlement more than compensates

Lange for all the damages the jury found she incurred. Certainly, Lange is entitled to the
benefit of the favorable settlement she reached with Geary. Eby is not asking that she
refund any money to Geary. However, if she had negotiated an unfavorably low
settlement with Geary, the judgment against Eby would have been available to
compensate her completely for damages attributable to Eby. Neither justice nor equity
should allow Lange to both retain the value of a settlement over and above her actual total
damages and then be entitled to a further windfall on top of that. Such a rule promotes
greed and litigation by encouraging plaintiffs who have been fully compensated through
settlements with some but not all defendants to seek more than they deserve from the nonsettling defendants. Our laws should seek to resolve litigation, not promote it, and to
provide a reasonable means for plaintiffs to be made whole, not to provide a risk free
opportunity for plaintiffs to receive windfalls far above their actual damages.
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If Lange is allowed to recover an additional $47,750 from Eby on top of the
$140,000 previously received from Geary, she would receive a total of $187,750 or over
three times the actual damages the jury found she sustained. Even vacating the judgment
because of the credit will result in Lange receiving two and one-half times her total
damages just from the settlement. Lange has been made more than whole by the party
who did the actual work to widen the road. She entered into a settlement that made her
more than whole before going to trial against Eby. Yet, she still demands that Eby pay
her "damages," only reduced to his proportionate share of fault, despite her having
received from Geary much more than the total amount of her damages. The law should
not, and indeed does not, turn courts into casinos where a fully compensated plaintiff can
take a risk free throw of the dice for a windfall verdict.
Courts exist to allow a peaceful way for citizens who are injured by others'
violation of the law to receive compensation for those injuries. The law previously
allowed injured plaintiffs, who had proven multiple defendants to be liable under the law,
to recover the full amount of recoverable damages from any single defendant or all
defendants, jointly or severally. The defendants then had rights to seek contribution or
indemnity from each other. Except for unusual circumstances, such as for punitive
damages, the law never allowed an injured plaintiff to recover more than the amount
needed to make that plaintiff whole.
In order to overcome the harsh effect of one defendant being forced through a
judgment to pay a plaintiff for damages caused in part by other defendants, the law was
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statutorily changed to what is called "comparative fault." UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-37 et
seq. (1986, as amended) (Utah Liability Reform Act or "LRA"). See Nelson v. Corp. of
Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 935 P.2d 512, 517 (Utah
1997). Now, plaintiffs only can recover from defendants the portion of damages
corresponding to each defendant's proportionate share of fault. The law did not change
to allow plaintiffs to recover more than what is needed to make them whole. The
development in the law through the LRA from joint and several liability to only several
liability limited to proportionate share of fault does not evidence a paradigm shift from
providing a means to make plaintiffs whole to providing a means to make plaintiffs richer
than what is needed to be made whole. If anything, the statutory change in the law
evidences the acceptance of a policy that makes it more difficult for plaintiffs to be fully
compensated in favor of protecting defendants from liability for what they did not cause.6
Regardless of whether a plaintiff is compensated from one of multiple defendants
that were jointly and severally liable or from one of multiple defendants only severally
liable (to the extent of that defendant's proportionate share of fault), the universal rule in
Utah remains that a plaintiff may not recover twice for one wrong. Green v. Lang Co.,
206 P.2d 626, 627-28 (Utah 1949) ("It is well established that there can be but one
satisfaction for injuries sustained in one wrong."); Dawson v. Bd. of Ed. of Weber County
School Dist, 222 P.2d 590, 592 (Utah 1950) (same). See also Brigham City Sand &

6

In general, plaintiffs no longer will be compensated for the wrongs of defendants
who cannot pay their share of the damages.
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Gravel v. Machinery Center, Inc., 613 P.2d 510, 511 (Utah 1980) (having elected to settle
with some defendants for the value of the lost property, the dismissal of the plaintiffs
claim against the non-settling defendant for the return of the property was affirmed." The
doctrine of election of remedies, which prevents a party from recovering more than once
for the same loss, is based upon principles of equity and justice."); Western Steel Co. v.
Travel Batcher Corp., 663 P.2d 82, 84 (Utah 1983) ("The law is well settled that an
obligee is entitled to be paid in full but cannot exact double recovery . . . . To the extent
that the release of claims satisfied the deficiency owing, it should be credited to all
defendants . . . as required by U.C.A., 1953, § 15-4-3 which is part of the Uniform Joint
Obligations Act adopted by our legislature in 1929."). Because of this "one recovery
rule," anything received by Lange as compensation for her same damages inures to the
benefit of all defendants, including Eby, and operates as a "payment pro tanto." See
Green, 206 P.2d at 627.
Obviously, this "pro tonto ("as far as it goes"7) application of a compensatory
payment to a plaintiff was applied to all defendants equally under the joint and several
liability rule. Under the comparative fault rule, a settlement payment is applied first as a
credit against the percentage of the damages attributable to the fault of the defendant
making the payment with only any excess being applied to the remaining defendants. In
either case, no co-defendant would have to pay what already has been paid to compensate
the plaintiff, but non-settling defendants would be liable only for that part of their

7

Black's Law Dictionary, 1100 (5th ed. 1979).
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obligation for which the plaintiff has not been compensated.
The one recovery rule is separately codified. UTAH CODE ANN. § 15-4-3 (1953)
(Uniform Joint Obligations Act or "JOA"). The one recovery rule, as legislatively
mandated in Utah Code Section 15-4-3, has been judicially upheld in the context of the
law as it existed before the LRA. The mere enactment of the LRA provides no reason
now to reject that rule and implicitly repeal that statute. The LRA did not expressly
abolish and did not even address the one recovery rule. There is no reason for this Court
to depart from pre-LRA precedent. Section 15-4-3 of the JOA remains good law and
must be enforced by this Court.
It first is necessary to review the fundamental principles of statutory construction
before analyzing Lange's contention that the LRA implicitly superceded and repealed
Section 15-4-3 of the JOA.
The "primary objective in construing enactments is to give effect to the
legislature's intent." Gohler v. Wood, 919 P.2d 561,562 (Utah 1996). "The plain
language of a statute is generally the best indication of that intent." Lyon v. Burton, 2000
UT 19, K 17, 5 P.3d 616, 622. "Therefore, 'where the statutory language is plain and
unambiguous, we do not look beyond the language's plain meaning to devine legislative
intent'"/*/, (citing Norton v. Royal Order of the Sun, 821 P.2d 1167, 1168 (Utah 1991).
Further with respect to legislative intent, statutes that have not been expressly
repealed are to be construed to be in harmony with all other statutes so that every
provision of all statutes, that are not in irreconcilable conflict, are given effect. The Utah
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Supreme Court cited approvingly from 2A C. Sands, Sutherland Statutory Construction, §
51.02, at 290 (4th ed. 1973), as follows:
In terms of legislative intent, it is assumed that whenever the legislature
enacts a provision it has in mind previous statutes relating to the same
subject matter, wherefore it is held that in the absence of any express repeal
or amendment therein, the new provision was enacted in accord with the
legislative policy embodied in those prior statutes, and they all should be
construed together.
Provisions in an act which are omitted in another act relating to the same
subject matter will be applied in a proceeding under the other act, when not
inconsistent with its purposes. Prior statutes relating to the same subject
matter are to be compared with the new provision; and if possible by
reasonable construction, both are to be so construed that effect is given to
every provision in all of them.
Statues in pari materia, although in apparent conflict, are so far as
reasonably possible construed to be in harmony with each other. But if there
is an irreconcilable conflict between the new provision and the prior statutes
relating to the same subject matter, the new provision will control as it is
the later expression of the legislature.
Murray City v. Hall, 663 P.2d 1314, 1318 (Utah 1983). "It is elementary that the repeal
or over-riding of an existing law by implication is not favored and only occurs if the later
statute is wholly irreconcilable with the former." Moss v. Board of Com 'rs of Salt Lake
City, 261 P.2d 961, 965 (Utah 1953). "'It is a rule of statutory construction that where
there are two or more statutes dealing with the same subject matter they will be construed
so as to maintain the integrity of both. Repeal by implication is not effected unless the
terms of the later enacted law are irreconcilable with the former." State v. Judd, 27 Utah
2d 79, 493 P.2d 604, 606 (1972).
Turning to the JOA, the legislature stated and, therefore, intended that "[t]he
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amount or value of any consideration received by the obligee from one or more of several
obligors . . . in whole or in partial satisfaction of their obligations shall be credited to the
extent of the amount received on the obligation of all co-obligors .. .." UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 15-4-3 (emphasis added). '"Obligee5 includes... a person having a right based on a
tort." Section 15-4-1(2). "'Obligor5 includes . . . aperson liable for a tort.55 Section 15-41(3). '"Several obligors5 means obligors severally bound for the same performance.55
Section 15-4-1(4). "Severally'5 is defined in Black's Law Dictionary (5th ed. 1979) as
follows: "Separate; individual; independent; severable. In this sense, the word is
distinguished from 'joint.5'5 Id. at p. 1232. The credit required by Section 15-4-3 clearly
is intended to be applied in this case to the alleged tort obligations shared by Eby and
Geary for the same wrong and compensating Lange for the same injury.
Eby and Geary were alleged by Lange and found by the jury to both be at fault for
the same loss and destruction of vegetation on Lange's property. Under the LRA, they
are jointly liable but not jointly bound as to the amount of their liability because they each
can be liable for Lange's total damages only to the extent of their proportionate share of
fault. The particular provisions of the JO A applicable here do not conflict with the LRA.
Rather the JOA expressly addresses several liability for common tort damages, as now
required by the LRA. The JOA and LRA can and must be harmonized to accomplish the
clearly stated legislative intent of both acts. The JOA must not be held to be implicitly
superceded by the LRA. That ruling would ignore legislative intent contrary to the
powers of the Court.
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Nowhere in the LRA, or anywhere else, is the credit intended by Section 15-4-3
expressly repealed. In compliance with proper statutory construction, this section cannot
be repealed by implication. In addition, the LRA itself stated, and at a minimum implies,
there is not a repeal of the JOA. In Section 78-27-43, the legislature stated that nothing in
the LRA "affects or impairs . . . statutory immunity from liability." Section 15-4-3
certainly is a statute that renders defendants immune from liability should a co-defendant
pay all of the plaintiffs tort damages. Nelson v. Corp. of Presiding Bishop of Church of
Jesus Christ ofLatter-day Saints, 935 P.2d512, 514-15 (Utah 1997) (if a jury finds
damages to be less than what a settling defendant paid, the non-settling defendant will
owe nothing, regardless of its liability, and in that sense is immune from liability).
The Nelson case, the principle Utah case relied upon by Lange and the trial court,
exemplifies proper statutory construction in affirming that Section 15-4-3 of the JOA is
not repealed by the LRA. In Nelson, personal injury tort damages were claimed against
two defendants. Those defendants also were alleged to be jointly liable under the theory
of respondeat superior, one defendant (the Church employer) being vicariously liable for
the conduct of the other (the employee). The employee settled and the agreement stated
that the plaintiff did not intend to release the non-settling Church that was claimed to be
vicariously liable for the conduct of the settling defendant, and plaintiff reserved all
claims against that remaining defendant. Id. at 512-13. The Church moved for summary
judgment claiming the release of the tortfeaser employee released the vicariously liable
employer regardless of the reservation of rights in the settlement agreement. Id. at 513-
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14. Both parties relied on their interpretation of the LRA.
The Utah Supreme Court, however, turned to the JOA to resolve the dispute. In
fact, the court expressly ruled that Section 15-4-4, which allows a reservation of rights,
governed and thus the plaintiff could pursue his claims against the remaining vicariously
liable defendant. Acknowledging that in an earlier decision {Krukiewicz v. Draper, 725
P.2d 1349, 1350 (Utah 1986)) the court ruled that the predecessor statute to the LRA,
Section 78-27-42 of the Comparative Negligence Act, repealed Section 15-4-4 of the
JOA, the court explained that now, to the extent the LRA addresses "regular codefendants," it too will repeal Section 15-4-4 but only to that limited extent.8 Id. at 514
n.3. The court stated that "since the LRA does not address vicariously (legally) liable
parties, Section 15-4-4 now applies to those parties." Id. at 514 n.3. Thus, the lesson
from Nelson is that the LRA did not implicitly repeal the JOA in toto, but instead if there
is a repeal it is to be narrowly limited to only irreconcilable provisions.

8

"Regular co-defendants" was stated to mean those who are liable because of fault.
Id. at 514 n. 3. The Comparative Negligence Act and LRA, which had similar provisions,
both provide that a release does not discharge any other defendant unless the release so
provides. See UTAH CODE ANN. 78-27-42 ("Release to one defendant does not discharge
other defendants. A release given by a person seeking recovery to one or more
defendants does not discharge any other defendant unless the release so provides."
Enacted by Chapter 199, 1986 General Session). Section 15-4-4 of the JOA was worded
oppositely to require the release to expressly reserve the right to go against the nonsettling defendant to avoid having that defendant discharged. The requirement of the LRA
and of the JOA were incompatible. Thus, because the LRA only addresses the liability of
defendants who bear fault, the Court applied the JOA in the context of that case where the
plaintiff expressly reserved the right to continue the action against the non-settlement
vicariously liable (factually fault free but legally liable defendant). The court's reasoning
had nothing to do with jointly versus severally liable defendants who each were at fault.
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There is no provision in the LRA that addresses Section 15-4-3, the section at issue
here. There is no irreconcilable conflict in provisions. Indeed, even Nelson expressly
affirms the applicability of Section 15-4-3 in the context of that post-LRA case. The
Nelson court stated: "Although plaintiff still has a claim against the [non-settling
defendant], plaintiff may not recover a windfall by receiving more than his actual
damages.... [U]nder Section 15-4-3 of the Joint Obligation Act, any amount received by
one obligor is to be credited against any amount owed by the rest.... If the jury finds
damages in an amount less than $100,000 [the settlement amount paid by the settling
defendant], the Church will owe nothing, regardless of liability." Id. at 514-15. The fact
that the defendants were alleged to be jointly liable under respondeate superior had
nothing to do with the Court's statements about the applicability of Section 15-4-3 of the
JOA. There was no hint that the LRA would conflict with and implicitly repeal section
15-4-3 in cases involving only severally responsible defendants. To the contrary, Nelson
leads to only one reasonable conclusion - Section 15-4-3 of the JOA is good law in the
current LRA era.
Eby anticipates that Lange will rely on foreign cases having no precedential value,
as she did below, in arguing generally that the mere existence of the LRA gives this Court
the legislative power to repeal a statute. Those cases should be rejected. This Court
should follow Utah case authority and statutory law on this issue. This Court should not
accept Lange's invitation to judicially legislate a departure from existing Utah law as it
has been articulated by our state legislature.
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The cases from foreign jurisdictions also are distinguishable. For example, in
Gemstar Ltd v. Ernst & Young, 917 P.2d 222 (Ariz. 1996), cited below by Lange, the
court did not construe the effect of a statute like Utah's Section 15-4-3 under subsequent
tort reform legislation. It merely considered three policy reasons for why it believed a
credit for a prior "settlement would undermine the policy justifications underlying several
only liability." Id. at 237. The court never identified those underlying policy
justifications for several liability, and the policies it came up with to justify its ruling have
nothing to do with several only liability. First, that court reasoned, the plaintiff should
have the benefit of his negotiated settlement. Second, it reasoned that a credit discourages
settlement by other defendants. Third, it reasoned that settlement dollars are only a
contractual estimate of liability. Those reasons do not justify denying a credit for only
severally liable defendants in the face of a statute that clearly states such credits "shall be"
made.9
Despite the Gemstar court's personal justification for its own agenda, a settling
plaintiff always will retain the benefit of his or her bargain even if a credit is required.
Nothing will have to be paid back by the plaintiff. The bargain the plaintiff accepted does
not disappear where there is several liability.10 Also, it makes no sense to suggest that

interestingly, a subsequent court has pointed out that the Gemstar case is limited
to where a plaintiff receives a partial settlement, not a full settlement that compensates the
plaintiff for all damages as is the case in the instant action. Wright v. Abbot Lab., 62 F.
Supp.2d 1186, 1199 n.8 (D. Kan. 1999).
10

At most, all that is different is that the plaintiff will have to consider before
reaching a settlement the effect of the comparative fault law that may result in that
plaintiff not being fully compensated should the settlement amount be less than that
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only non-settling severally liable defendants will be discouraged from settling. If
severally liable defendants are now discouraged from settling because of Section 15-4-3,
so were jointly liable defendants under the law before the enactment of the LRA. In
reality, allowing a credit merely precludes plaintiffs from being able to extort settlements
from defendants who realize the particular plaintiff already has been sufficiently
compensated. Allowing a credit will resolve litigation by encouraging plaintiffs to
dismiss claims after being fully compensated. Disallowing a credit promotes frivolous or
greed driven litigation by plaintiffs who no longer have suffered any loss. Further,
settlements are entered and monies paid to compensate injured plaintiffs. They are a
compromise that results from many factors, not just the settling defendant's estimate of
his or her own liability. The factors include the extent of injury and damages suffered.
Settlement amounts are far from an exact science. The goal is to offer sufficient
compensation to be released from further litigation. This truth equally pertains to both
severally liable defendants and jointly liable defendants.
As illustrated by this discussion, courts should not attempt to legislate and this
Court should not pay any attention to foreign courts that have gone down that path. If the
law is to be changed in Utah, it should be changed by the Utah State Legislature, after full

settling defendant's share of fault. Similar considerations existed under joint and several
liability. For example, a plaintiff has to consider the fact that non-settling defendants may
not be able to pay any judgment, again leaving the plaintiff less than fully compensated
should the settlement amount be less than the amount of damages determined by the jury.
Just because there may be different factors to consider in deciding whether to agree to the
settlement, there is no difference in the nature of the ultimate bargain agreed to by the
plaintiff. Settling plaintiffs always will retain the benefit of whatever bargains they reach.
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consideration of all policy issues.
This Court now should apply Utah law to the specific facts at hand and vacate the
current judgment. Rule 60(b), of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, expressly grants
authority to "relieve a party from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following
reasons: (1) mistake ...; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied . . .
or discharged . . . or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective
application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment."
Because the trial court reached an incorrect conclusion of law, i.e., refused to apply a
statute which expressly requires that Eby be credited with Geary's settlement, the trial
court erroneously refused to grant relief under this rule. This Court should reverse that
ruling and grant Eby relief from the judgment.
The trial court committed a judicial mistake. A judicial mistake, for purposes of
Rule 60(b), is one that pertains to the rendering of the judgment; it is a judicial error as
opposed to a clerical error. Richards v. Siddoway, 24 Utah 2d 314, 471 P.2d 143, 145
(1970); Atkin v. Parrish Oil Tools, Inc., 680 P.2d 401,402 (Utah 1984). In this case, the
trial court signed and entered the judgment immediately upon receipt of it and before Eby
could object to it. The form of judgment should have been sent to Eby for review and the
opportunity to object before it was even sent to the trial court. Moreover, the trial court
should have known Eby was given no opportunity to object because the judgment was
submitted and signed less than five week days after the verdict was rendered. See Utah R.
Civ. P. 7(f)(2).
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The trial court had previously ruled that it would consider the legal issue of the
credit should a verdict be entered against Eby. It was a judicial mistake for the trial court
to enter a judgment before considering and ruling on the legal issue of the credit and to do
so without allowing Eby an opportunity to remind the trial court of its earlier decision to
defer this ruling. Indeed, it was misleading for the trial court to defer a ruling before and
during trial and tell Eby that he could be heard on this issue after trial and then rule
contrary to Eby's interest without even giving him a chance to object. Such conduct by
the trial court should constitute an abuse of discretion if not legal error, and Eby should
be granted relief from the judgment erroneously entered against him.
Most importantly, the judgment resulted from a mistake because the trial court
ignored and acted directly contrary to Utah law in failing to take into account a credit for
the settlement amount in the judgment it entered. Section 15-4-3 mandates trial courts to
credit settlement amounts against judgments. The trial court clearly did not do this and
the Rule 60(b) motion gave the trial court the opportunity to grant Eby relief from this
judicial mistake.
In addition to the judgment being the result of a mistake, it has been satisfied,
discharged and rendered void through the payment and remedial work of Geary. Because
Lange has been fully (in fact more than fully) compensated, it is not equitable that the
judgment have prospective application against Eby. It should not be allowed to be
enforced (prospective application). It should be vacated because Lange is not allowed by
Utah law to recover the additional amount of the judgment on top of what she already has
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received. The trial court has no discretion to refuse to vacate a judgment that more than
compensates Lange for the total damages she was awarded by the jury. It is an abuse of
the trial court's discretion and a legal error not to have granted Eby relief from that
judgment in order to correctly comply with the law that entitles Eby to be credited with
the overpayment Geary made to Lange.
Eby did everything he could to get the trial court to comply with the law and avoid
allowing Lange a double recovery. He sought before trial to be allowed to tell the jury
the truth about the remedial work Geary had agreed to do. The trial court decided to
solve that issue by waiting to see if a verdict was entered against Eby and then to
determine how to avoid a double recovery. But after the verdict, the trial court
nevertheless entered a judgment that provided a double recovery before Eby even had a
chance to oppose it. Thereafter, the trial court denied Eby's Motion for Relief from that
Judgment. It is incumbent upon this Court to correct the legal errors below and now grant
Eby relief from the improperly entered and legally satisfied judgment. This Court should
enforce in the context of this case the rule of law that plaintiffs are entitled to one
recovery only. The trial court's order should be reversed and the judgment accordingly
vacated.
CONCLUSION
Eby respectfully requests that this Court reverse the Order Denying Eby's Motion
For Relief From Judgment. That order was wrongfully entered upon an incorrect
interpretation of the law pertaining to the one recovery rule as codified in Utah Code
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Section 15-4-3. In compliance with the one recovery rule and pursuant to the removal of
the trial court's order, it is further requested that the judgment against Eby be vacated.
Eby also requests his costs on appeal.
DATED this 6th day of July, 2005.
BERMAN & SAVAGE, P.C.
E. Scott Savage
Casey K. McGarvey

Attorneys for David Eby
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ADDENDUM

1.

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 15-4-3 (1953)

2.

UTAH CODE ANN.

§§ 78-27-37 to 43 (1986) as amended)
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Tabl

15-4-3. Payments by co-obligor.
The amount or value of any consideration received by the obligee from one or more of several
obligors, or from one or more of joint or of joint and several obligors, in whole or in partial
satisfaction of their obligations shall be credited to the extent of the amount received on the
obligation of all co-obligors to whom the obligor or obligors giving the consideration did not
stand in the relation of a surety.

Tab 2

78-27-37. Definitions.
As used in Sections 78-27-37 through Section 78-27-43:
(1) "Defendant" means a person, other than a person immune from suit as defined in Subsection
(3), who is claimed to be liable because of fault to any person seeking recovery.
(2) "Fault" means any actionable breach of legal duty, act, or omission proximately causing or
contributing to injury or damages sustained by a person seeking recovery, including negligence in
all its degrees, comparative negligence, assumption of risk, strict liability, breach of express or
implied warranty of a product, products liability, and misuse, modification, or abuse of a product.
(3) "Person immune from suit" means:
(a) an employer immune from suit under Title 34A, Chapter 2, Workers' Compensation Act, or
Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act; and
(b) a governmental entity or governmental employee immune from suit pursuant to Title 63,
Chapter 30d, Governmental Immunity Act of Utah.
(4) "Person seeking recovery" means any person seeking damages or reimbursement on its own
behalf, or on behalf of another for whom it is authorized to act as legal representative.
78-27-38. Comparative negligence.
(1) The fault of a person seeking recovery may not alone bar recovery by that person.
(2) A person seeking recovery may recover from any defendant or group of defendants whose
fault, combined with the fault of persons immune from suit and nonparties to whom fault is
allocated, exceeds the fault of the person seeking recovery prior to any reallocation of fault made
under Subsection 78-27-39(2).
(3) No defendant is liable to any person seeking recovery for any amount in excess of the
proportion of fault attributed to that defendant under Section 78-27-39.
(4) (a) The fact finder may, and when requested by a party shall, allocate the percentage or
proportion of fault attributable to each person seeking recovery, to each defendant, to any person
immune from suit, and to any other person identified under Subsection 78-27-41(4) for whom
there is a factual and legal basis to allocate fault. In the case of a motor vehicle accident
involving an unidentified motor vehicle, the existence of the vehicle shall be proven by clear and
convincing evidence which may consist solely of one person's testimony.
(b) Any fault allocated to a person immune from suit is considered only to accurately determine
the fault of the person seeking recovery and a defendant and may not subject the person immune
from suit to any liability, based on the allocation of fault, in this or any other action.
78-27-39. Separate special verdicts on total damages and proportion of fault.
(1) The trial court may, and when requested by any party shall, direct the jury, if any, to find
separate special verdicts determining the total amount of damages sustained and the percentage
or proportion of fault attributable to each person seeking recovery, to each defendant, to any
person immune from suit, and to any other person identified under Subsection 78-27-41(4) for
whom there is a factual and legal basis to allocate fault.
(2) (a) If the combined percentage or proportion of fault attributed to all persons immune from
suit is less than 40%, the trial court shall reduce that percentage or proportion of fault to zero and

reallocate that percentage or proportion of fault to the other parties and those identified under
Subsection 78-27-41(4) for whom there is a factual and legal basis to allocate fault in proportion
to the percentage or proportion of fault initially attributed to each by the fact finder. After this
reallocation, cumulative fault shall equal 100% with the persons immune from suit being
allocated no fault.
(b) If the combined percentage or proportion of fault attributed to all persons immune from suit is
40% or more, that percentage or proportion of fault attributed to persons immune from suit may
not be reduced under Subsection (2)(a).
(c) (i) The jury may not be advised of the effect of any reallocation under Subsection (2).
(ii) The jury may be advised that fault attributed to persons immune from suit may reduce the
award of the person seeking recovery.
(3) A person immune from suit may not be held liable, based on the allocation of fault, in this or
any other action.

78-27-40. Amount of liability limited to proportion of fault — No contribution.
(1) Subject to Section 78-27-38, the maximum amount for which a defendant may be liable to
any person seeking recovery is that percentage or proportion of the damages equivalent to the
percentage or proportion of fault attributed to that defendant.
(2) A defendant is not entitled to contribution from any other person.
(3) A defendant or person seeking recovery may not bring a civil action against any person
immune from suit to recover damages resulting from the allocation of fault under Section 78-2738.
78-27-41. Joinder of defendants.
(1) A person seeking recovery, or any defendant who is a party to the litigation, may join as a
defendant, in accordance with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, any person other than a person
immune from suit alleged to have caused or contributed to the injury or damage for which
recovery is sought, for the purpose of having determined their respective proportions of fault.
(2) A person immune from suit may not be named as a defendant, but fault may be allocated to a
person immune from suit solely for the purpose of accurately determining the fault of the person
seeking recovery and all defendants. A person immune from suit is not subject to any liability,
based on the allocation of fault, in this or any other action.
(3) (a) A person immune from suit may intervene as a party under Rule 24, Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, regardless of whether or not money damages are sought.
(b) A person immune from suit who intervenes in an action may not be held liable for any fault
allocated to that person under Section 78-27-38.
(4) Fault may not be allocated to a non-party unless a party timely files a description of the
factual and legal basis on which fault can be allocated and information identifying the non-party,
to the extent known or reasonably available to the party, including name, address, telephone
number and employer. The party shall file the description and identifying information in
accordance with Rule 9, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure or as ordered by the court but in no event
later than 90 days before trial as provided in Rule 9, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

78-27-42. Release to one defendant does not discharge other defendants.
A release given by a person seeking recovery to one or more defendants does not discharge any
other defendant unless the release so provides.
78-27-43. Effect on immunity, exclusive remedy, indemnity, contribution.
Nothing in Sections 78-27-37 through 78-27-42 affects or impairs any common law or statutory
immunity from liability, including, but not limited to, governmental immunity as provided in
Title 63, Chapter 30d, and the exclusive remedy provisions of Title 34A, Chapter 2, Workers'
Compensation Act. Nothing in Sections 78-27-37 through 78-27-42 affects or impairs any right
to indemnity or contribution arising from statute, contract, or agreement.

